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NOT-SO-HARMLESS ERROR: A HIGHER STANDARD
FOR MITIGATION ERRORS ON CAPITAL HABEAS
REVIEW
Ryan C. Thomas
Abstract: This Comment looks at how federal courts handle mitigation errors during the
penalty phase of capital punishment cases on habeas corpus review; it argues that the United
States Supreme Court should expressly adopt the Chapman “harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard rather than the Brecht “substantial and injurious effect” standard. The
heightened stakes of capital sentencing dictate that a higher standard of review should apply.
The Court has yet to rule on this matter, and the United States Courts of Appeals cannot
agree upon which standard to apply.
Currently, a lopsided circuit split exists regarding whether harmless error review applies
to mitigation errors, and if so, what standard should apply. While the Court has yet to decide
this issue, it has dealt with harmless error review in non-capital cases. The Chapman
harmless error standard, promulgated by the Court in 1967, requires that a state must prove
that any constitutional errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In 1993, the Brecht
Court found the Chapman standard too onerous for collateral attacks and determined that a
lower standard was necessary: during collateral attacks, the defendant must show that the
error had a substantial and injurious effect upon determining the jury’s verdict. Chapman
placed the burden upon the State; Brecht placed the burden upon the defendant.
This Comment argues that the higher Chapman standard should apply to collateral
attacks in capital habeas cases because of the possibility of a total deprivation of one’s life
and liberty. The Court has before determined that “death is different,” and in keeping with
that sentiment, the Court should adopt an error standard that similarly acknowledges the
difference between life and death.

INTRODUCTION
This Comment addresses which harmless error standard should be
used when analyzing mitigation errors on habeas corpus review. Habeas
corpus review occurs when a defendant exhausts his or her state appeals
and subsequently seeks the ancient writ of habeas corpus 1 as codified in
28 U.S.C. § 2254. 2
This Comment examines cases where the defendant claims that the
state trial court violated his or her constitutional rights during sentencing
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009) (“[Habeas corpus is a] writ employed to bring a
person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not
illegal.”). For an excellent overview of this complicated terrain, see generally Habeas Relief for
State Prisoners, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 872 (2008).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).

515

16 - Thomas Comment.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2014 12:19 PM

516

[Vol. 89:515

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

by committing mitigation error. During the sentencing phase of a capital
punishment trial the defendant may present mitigation evidence—any
relevant information regarding the defendant’s person and history—that
may cause a juror to deliver a sentence less than death. 3 Mitigation
errors often take one of two forms: Lockett error or Penry error. Lockett
error occurs when the court denies the defendant the chance to present
any relevant evidence that may cause a jury to deliver a sentence less
than death. 4 Mitigation may include evidence of a difficult family
history, mental disturbance, healthy adjustment to life in prison,
emotional disturbance, or false imprisonment. 5 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has said that virtually no limits are placed upon what
evidence a capital defendant may offer to mitigate his or her sentence.6
Penry error occurs when the jury is precluded from giving full meaning
and effect to the defendant’s evidence during deliberations and in
making their sentence, usually through poorly written jury instructions.7
The wording of these jury questions may preclude full consideration of
mitigation evidence, resulting in Penry error. 8 Throughout this
Comment, the term “mitigation error” will be used in reference to errors
that preclude core elements of mitigation evidence,9 namely Lockett
error and Penry error. 10
In order to logically and effectively show why the United States
Supreme Court should adopt the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard articulated in Chapman v. California,11 this Comment proceeds
in six parts. Part I discusses the general background of capital
punishment cases. Part II looks at the foundational capital sentencing
mitigation cases. Part III examines three key ingredients in capital
habeas harmless error review. Part IV surveys the circuit split. Part V
argues that the Court should reject the Brecht standard and adopt the
3. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.” (emphasis in original)).
4. See id.
5. See infra Part I.B.1.
6. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).
7. See infra Part I.B.2.
8. See Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part II.
11. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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Chapman standard for habeas review of mitigation errors. Finally, part
VI considers the impact of mitigation error upon jurors.
I.

HOW DIFFERENT IS DEATH? AN OVERVIEW OF A
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASE

The 1970s was a tumultuous era for this nation’s capital punishment
jurisprudence: 1972 saw a de facto moratorium on the death penalty
initiated by the Court in Furman v. Georgia, 12 followed by its
resuscitation a short four years later in Gregg v. Georgia. 13 Only two
years after Gregg, the Court decided another landmark case that
protected a capital defendant’s right to present mitigation evidence:
Lockett v. Ohio. 14 In Lockett the Court offered a surprising—and
prophetic—sliver of self-deprecation: “The signals from this Court have
not . . . always been easy to decipher. The States now deserve the
clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we have an obligation to
reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that guidance.”15
Ironically, Chief Justice Burger wrote these words in a plurality opinion
that was followed by four separate opinions. 16 Unfortunately, the Court’s
capital punishment jurisprudence remains foggy and complex, providing
fodder for circuit splits and scholarship.
When the United States Supreme Court discussed the idea that death
is different in Furman v. Georgia, 17 it began a conversation in United
States jurisprudence that philosophers had long been debating. 18 The
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death penalty statutes at issue violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
13. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (holding that the death penalty does not violate the constitution).
14. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 602.
16. See id. Justices Blackmun and Marshall each filed separate, concurring opinions. See id. at
613 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Rehnquist and White
each filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. See id. at 628 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 621 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
17. Kevin Michael Miller, Note, Romano v. Oklahoma: The Requirement of Jury’s Sense of
Responsibility and Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1307, 1319–20 (1995)
(noting that Furman v. Georgia began the “death is different” dialogue); see also Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 605 (“[T]he imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other
penalties . . . .”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“The penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.”).
18. See generally ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 173–234 (Justin
O’Brien trans., 1960) (1957) (critiquing the purported justifications of capital punishment); Exodus
20:13 (“You shall not murder.”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194–204 (photo.
reprint, 1965) (1797) (discussing the necessity of the death penalty); THE QUR’AN 6:151 (“[D]o not
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moral, intellectual, and legal battle continues in the nation’s discourse—
a quick Internet news search reveals hundreds of articles discussing
various aspects of the complex topic. 19 Questions surrounding the cost
and efficacy of capital punishment abound. 20 Death penalty cases play
by both substantively and procedurally different rules than non-capital
cases. The procedural differences are readily apparent in two significant
ways: the qualification of the jury 21 and the bifurcation of the trial into
two phases. 22
A.

The Procedural Posture of Capital Cases: Death Qualification and
Trial Bifurcation

In order to set the table for this discussion, a high-level overview of a
capital trial is in order. Such an attempt at clarity is inherently plagued
from the outset, however, because each state has a unique statutory
scheme. This background, then, will provide only a 30,000-foot view of
a landscape that could be mapped by the inch; it looks first at (1) the
death qualification of a capital jury and (2) the bifurcation of capital
cases.
1.

The Death Qualification of Juries: Removing Jurors at the
Extremes

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court gave states permission to
qualify juries by removing jurors who categorically opposed the death
take the life god has made sacred, except by right.”); Hugo Adam Bedau, Bentham’s Utilitarian
Critique of the Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033 (1983) (analyzing the
development of Bentham’s critique of capital punishment).
19. See generally Editorial, End the Death Penalty, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at A14; Ban
the Death Penalty, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 23, 2014, 9:11 PM), www.bloombergview.com/articles/
2014-02-23/ban-the-death-penalty; Death for the Mentally Disabled, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 4,
2014, 3:22 PM), www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/03/capitalpunishment; Tal
Kopan, ‘Ground Zero’ for the Death Penalty, POLITCO (Feb. 26, 2014, 6:12 AM),
www.politco.com/story/2014/02/death-penalty-missouri-103973.html; Michael Lipka, Support for
Death Penalty Drops Among Americans, PEW RES. CENTER (Feb. 12, 2014), www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2014/02/12/support-for-death-penalty-drops-among-americans/.
20. See generally Justin F. Marceau & Hollis A. Whitson, The Cost of Colorado’s Death Penalty,
3 UNIV. DENVER CRIM. L. REV. 145 (2013) (comparing the court cost of death penalty cases to nondeath penalty cases for similar crimes, concluding that the high costs fails to yield measurable
benefits).
21. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (noting that while death qualification
possesses serious flaws, the Constitution does not prohibit states from death qualifying juries).
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that in order to ensure that “the penalty
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner,” capital trials should proceed in a
bifurcated proceeding).
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penalty. 23 In a typical jury trial, a large number of potential jurors are
called to the courthouse. 24 While each state’s process varies in detail, the
basic methodology is the same: counsel for each party questions
potential jurors and exercises its peremptory challenges 25 and challenges
for cause. 26 While states may increase the number of peremptory
challenges available during capital cases, 27 the process differs from
noncapital cases in one significant way: each juror may be qualified,
meaning that they must be willing to consider sentencing the defendant
to death. 28 Let that statement soak in for a moment. Seated jurors
certainly will be free to make whatever choice they deem most fair after
the sentencing phase; but at voir dire, all jurors who emphatically oppose
the death penalty are removed, as are those who categorically think that
the death penalty should be imposed. 29 This selection process is aimed at
removing the jurors at the extremes, hopefully creating a jury that will
give meaningful effect to all of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented during the trial. However, the process raises
some questions surrounding whether the defendant is actually tried by a
jury of his or her peers; such questions exceed the scope of this
Comment.
2.

A Two-Step Dance: The Bifurcation of the Capital Trial

The second major difference in death penalty cases is the bifurcated
structure. Death penalty cases take the form of two distinct trials. 30 In
23. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (noting that the Constitution allows the states
to death qualify capital juries).
24. As an extreme example, the jury pool for the James Holmes trial following the 2012 Aurora,
Colorado movie theater shooting started at 6,000. Trevor Hughes, 6,000 to be Called for Aurora
Theater Shooting Jury Pool, COLORADOAN.COM (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/
20131007/NEWS01/310070027/6-000-called-Aurora-theater-shooting-jury-pool.
25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261–62 (9th ed. 2009) (defining peremptory challenge as “[o]ne
of a party’s limited number of challenges that do not need to be supported by a reason”).
26. Id. (defining challenge for cause as “[a] party’s challenge supported by a specified reason,
such as bias or prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror”). For a statutory example, see
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.050 (2013).
27. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 230–32 (2006).
28. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173 (1986).
29. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (“[A] capital defendant may challenge for cause
any prospective juror [that] will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case . . . .”); see
generally Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (upholding Arkansas’s statutory scheme that allowed the
prosecution to remove jurors “who stated that they could not under any circumstance vote for the
imposition of the death penalty”).
30. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that capital trials should proceed in a
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part one—the guilt phase—the elements of the crime must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 31 Death penalty cases and non-death penalty
cases are substantively the same during the guilt phase. If guilt is
established, the death penalty trial moves to part two. In part two—the
sentencing, or penalty, phase—the prosecution attempts to convince the
jury that the defendant should receive the death penalty due to the
aggravating factors in the case, while the defense will present mitigating
evidence in order to convince the jury that the defendant deserves a
sentence less than death. 32 This second phase distinguishes capital cases
from noncapital cases.
Non-capital criminal cases address the sentence in a separate hearing
once guilt has been established; these sentencing hearings must occur
“without unnecessary delay.” 33 In federal (and some state) cases, series
of reports and memoranda will be written and submitted to the court. 34
No witnesses will be called, and while it is possible to present new
evidence, this is rarely done. 35
If “death is different,” then death sentencing must also be different. 36
In the sentencing phase of capital cases—colloquially called the “death
phase” 37—the prosecution highlights the aggravating factors of the
crime in an effort to convince the jury that the only reasonable

bifurcated proceeding in order to ensure that the penalty of death is fairly imposed); see, e.g., TEX.
CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(a)(1) (West 2013) (“If a defendant is tried for a capital
offense in which the state seeks the death penalty, on a finding that the defendant is guilty of a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the
defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole.”).
31. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
32. For a collection of statutory schemes that the Court has both upheld and struck down, see
James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Aggravating and
Mitigating Provisions of Death Penalty Statutes—Supreme Court Cases, 21 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1
(2007).
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(1).
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i); see also REV. CODE. WASH. § 9.94A.500 (2014).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2).
36. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“We are satisfied that this
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when
the death sentence is imposed. . . . [T]he imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly
different from all other penalties . . . .”); see also Miller, supra note 17 at 1319–20 (noting that
Furman v. Georgia began the “death is different” dialogue).
37. See, e.g., Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1390 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting trial dialogue
using “death phase”).
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punishment for the defendant is death. 38 The defense will present a host
of mitigating factors in order to convince the jury that the defendant
deserves a punishment less than death. 39 This may include evidence of a
troubled family history, 40 emotional disturbance, 41 wrongful
incarceration, 42 photographs of family members, 43 or parental
abandonment, 44 among other evidence.45 While the defense has wide
latitude to present mitigating evidence, the evidence must be relevant.46
The United States Supreme Court sets a low bar for relevance:
[T]he meaning of relevance is no different in the context of
mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing
proceeding than in any other context, and thus the general
evidentiary standard—any tendency to make the existence of
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without
evidence—applies. 47
Thus, the defendant may present for mitigation any evidence relevant
under that individual state’s rules of evidence, or federally, under
Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
Whereas non-capital cases function as a whole, capital cases are
procedurally unique, both because the jury must be death qualified and
because the trial is bifurcated into the guilt phase and the sentencing
phase. Capital cases are also substantively different than noncapital
38. See Sharon Turlington, Completely Unguided Discretion: Admitting Non-Statutory
Aggravating and Non-Statutory Mitigating Evidence in Capital Sentencing Trials, 6 PIERCE L. REV.
469, 470 (2008) (noting the procedural safeguard of state statutory schemes listing aggravating
factors that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty).
39. Id.
40. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) (“Evidence of a difficult family history and
of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.”).
41. Id.
42. See Dixon v. Houk, 737 F.3d 1003, 1011 (6th. Cir. 2013) (noting that wrongful incarceration
is valid mitigation evidence).
43. See State v. Conway, 848 N.E.2d 810, 827–28 (Ohio 2006) (noting that photographs should
be permitted as a part of the defendant’s mitigation presentation).
44. See Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 306 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that abandonment as a
child constitutes valid mitigation evidence).
45. See Terry M. Lenamon, Terry Lenamon’s List of State Death Penalty Mitigation Statutes
(Full Text), TERRY LENAMON ON THE DEATH PENALTY (May 10, 2010), http://www.jdsupra.com/
post/fileServer.aspx?fName=d61d8c7b-896b-4c1a-bd87-f86425206b45.pdf (compiling the various
state statutes defining mitigation evidence).
46. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 & n.12 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Nothing in this
opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on
the defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of the offense.”).
47. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
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cases because of the additional evidence of aggravating and mitigating
factors presented during the sentencing phase of the trial.
B.

The Capital Defendant’s Right to Present Mitigating Evidence

As the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence has grown, so has
the concept of mitigation. Not long after Gregg v. Georgia, 48 in which
the Court ended the de facto moratorium on capital punishment, 49 the
Court recognized that “in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 50
The Court then began developing its mitigation jurisprudence, and in so
doing, required that the jury be permitted three elements of mitigation
evidence: (1) the ability to hear the evidence, (2) the ability to give
meaningful effect to the evidence, and (3) the ability to consider the
individual characteristics of the defendant.
1.

The Jury Must Be Able to Hear the Mitigation Evidence

At a fundamental level, the sentencer must be given the opportunity to
hear the defense’s presentation of mitigation evidence. 51 This is the most
apparent requirement of mitigation—it makes sense that the evidence
must be heard in order to obtain any effect upon the jury’s decision
making. Thus, the judge cannot preclude the defendant from presenting
mitigation evidence. In order to put logical restraints on the scope of the
mitigating evidence, it must meet the low threshold for relevance.52 The
Court has deemed evidence “relevant” that shows healthy adjustment to
prison, 53 evidence of a disturbed childhood, 54 emotional disturbance, 55
and wrongful incarceration, 56 to name a few. 57 In fact, the Court noted
48. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
49. Id. at 187 (“We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be
imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender,
and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.”).
50. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
51. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
52. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004).
53. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 US 1, 7 (1986).
54. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–16 (1982).
55. Id.
56. See Dixon v. Houk, 737 F.3d 1003, 1011 (6th. Cir. 2013).
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the expansive possibilities of mitigating evidence when it said that
“virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.” 58
This wide latitude provides the defense with nearly limitless
opportunities to present relevant evidence that may lead the jury to
believe that the defendant deserves a punishment less than death. The
omission of such evidence is often called Lockett error. 59
2.

The Jury Must Be Able to Give Meaningful Effect to the Mitigation
Evidence

Once the jury has heard the evidence, it must be able to give
“meaningful effect” to the evidence.60 In fact, the Court has said that
“when a jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a reasoned
moral response to a defendant’s mitigation evidence—because it is
forbidden from doing so by statute or a judicial interpretation of a
statute—the sentencing process is fatally flawed.” 61 The Court requires,
then, that the jury not only hear the evidence, but that it is able to
consider the evidence during sentencing. Accurate jury instructions are
important to ensure that the “meaningful effect” element is met. 62
Flawed jury instructions can deny the jury the ability to give meaningful
effect to mitigation evidence, and have provoked much litigation
especially in the form of special issue questions. 63 This problem has
plagued the Texas capital punishment statute, and will be discussed in
depth in Part II.B. In some states, such as Texas, the jury will be
presented with special issues in the jury instructions. 64 The Texas special
57. See supra Part I.A.2.
58. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991).
59. See, e.g., Eddings, 455 U.S. at 120 n.1 (1982) (referring to this type of mitigation error as
Lockett error).
60. Abul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. See Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 316 (2007) (noting that the special issue questions in
Texas’s capital punishment statute do not allow for adequate consideration of mitigation evidence);
see also Quarterman, 550 U.S. at 253–54 (granting habeas relief because of a reasonable likelihood
that the jury instructions prevented jurors from giving meaningful effect to mitigation evidence);
Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002) (invalidating flawed jury instructions prevent jurors from giving full consideration to
mitigation evidence); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988) (invalidating Maryland’s capital
punishment statute because it failed to allow jurors to properly consider mitigation evidence); Bell
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (holding that the Ohio death penalty statute failed to permit
jurors to give meaningful effect to mitigation evidence).
64. Smith, 550 U.S. at 300 (“Under Texas law the jury verdict form provides special-issue
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issues will pose a series of questions, and if the jury responds “yes” to
each of the special issues, then the defendant must be sentenced to
death. 65 In order to comport with Lockett, these special issues must be
written so as to allow for the consideration of the mitigation evidence.66
A failure to do so may violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 67
of the United States Constitution, 68 rendering the instructions
unconstitutional; such violations are called Penry error, 69 which can be
understood as a form of Lockett error.
Mills v. Maryland 70 provides a good example of such Penry error. 71 In
Mills, the lower court gave jury instructions that dealt with both the
aggravating and mitigating factors presented during the sentencing
phase; jurors were instructed to fill out the jury form in order to return
the verdict. 72 The instructions were confusing and the Court held that
they deprived the jurors of giving the mitigation evidence meaningful
effect. 73 In arriving at its decision, the Court said:
We conclude that there is a substantial probability that
reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge’s instructions in this
case, and in attempting to complete the verdict form as
instructed, well may have thought they were precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed
on the existence of a particular such circumstance. Under our
cases, the sentencer must be permitted to consider all mitigating
evidence. The possibility that a single juror could block such
consideration, and consequently require the jury to impose the
death penalty, is one we dare not risk. 74
The Court remanded the case for resentencing in compliance with its

questions to guide the jury in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.”).
65. Id. at 301.
66. See Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV (equal protection of the laws).
68. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e conclude that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.”).
69. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328.
70. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
71. Id. at 377–80.
72. Id. at 370.
73. Id. at 384.
74. Id.
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opinion. 75 This case shows the importance of ensuring that the jury
instructions provide a proper vehicle to give meaningful effect to the
presented mitigation evidence.
3.

The Jury Must Give Individual Consideration to the Facts of the
Case and Characteristics of the Defendant

Sentencing schemes must take into account the unique facts of each
case and each defendant. 76 This idea, known as individualization, was at
the heart of the Court’s de facto death penalty moratorium in Furman v.
Georgia. 77 The Court’s per curiam opinion in Furman held that capital
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. 78 While the Furman per
curiam opinion was only one paragraph long, the concurrences and
dissents rolled on for over one hundred pages. 79 Two Justices concluded
that capital punishment always violates the Eighth Amendment; 80 three
Justices were unwilling categorically find that capital punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment, but held that discretionary sentencing
violates the Eighth Amendment because discretionary sentencing
statutes are “pregnant with discrimination.”81 The remaining four
Justices dissented, arguing that capital punishment had always been
constitutional and should remain a proper punishment for serious
crimes. 82 Furman created confusion among states regarding how to
properly sentence a defendant to death without running afoul of the
Eighth Amendment. 83
In Gregg v. Georgia 84 the Court revisited capital punishment’s
constitutionality and ended the de facto moratorium. 85 Soon thereafter,

75. Id.
76. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976).
77. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 238.
79. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
80. Id. at 305–06 (Brennan, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 375–405 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414
(Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 598–600 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he variety of
opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion . . . .”); see also Furman, 408
U.S. at 403 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Since there is not majority of the Court on the ultimate issue
presented in these cases, the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in an
uncertain limbo.”).
84. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
85. Id. at 169.
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Woodson v. North Carolina 86 Court struck down North Carolina’s
statutory scheme that required the death sentence as the penalty for first
degree murder. 87 It reasoned that the jury must be given sentencing
discretion and allowed to exercise restraint. 88 The mandatory death
penalty scheme had been ineffective because United States history had
shown that jurors, “with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and
refused to convict defendants where a death sentence was the automatic
consequence of a guilty verdict.” 89 Later, the Court in Arizona v. Ring 90
held that the jury—not the judge—must find the statutorily defined
aggravating factors necessary to sentence the defendant to death.91
The rationale applied in Woodson and Ring became known as
individualization, 92 and is regarded as one of the “fundamental
commandments” of capital sentencing. 93 Individualization mandates that
each juror be able to consider and give effect to the individual facts of
the case and characteristics of the defendant, 94 mitigating factors
included. 95 This individualization rationale is at the heart of Penry error.
II.

THE FOUNDATIONAL MITIGATION CASES

A complete discussion of mitigation error in capital punishment cases
requires an examination of the essential cases in mitigation

86. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
87. Id. at 301.
88. Id. at 304.
89. Id. at 293.
90. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
91. Id. at 609 (“Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ . . . the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found
by a jury.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 n.19 (2000))).
92. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“While the prevailing practice of
individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”).
93. Scott. E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1991).
94. Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The immediate post-Furman
Supreme Court cases addressing this and other sentencing schemes attempted to strike a balance
between satisfying two competing constitutional requirements—the requirement of ‘individualized
sentencing’ that takes into account the unique facts of each case and each defendant, and the
requirement of preventing the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty that can result from giving
the sentencer unfettered discretion.”).
95. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
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jurisprudence: Lockett v. Ohio 96 and Penry v. Lynaugh. 97
A.

Lockett v. Ohio: A Defendant Can Present Any Mitigation
Evidence

Any meaningful conversation about mitigation in capital cases
necessarily involves Lockett v. Ohio. 98 Lockett is to mitigation as
Miranda 99 is to post-arrest silence. 100 The case provides us with this key
language that serves as the progenitor of mitigation jurisprudence:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death. 101
While this language came from the plurality of the Court, the rationale
has since been affirmed and lies as the foundation of mitigation
doctrine. 102
In Lockett, Sandra Lockett and several of her friends conspired to rob
a pawnshop in Akron, Ohio. 103 A plan was created whereby one person
would enter the shop and distract the store clerk by attempting to pawn a
ring. 104 Meanwhile, another accomplice named Al Parker would enter
and ask to see a gun. 105 After loading the gun with ammunition he
carried, Parker would holdup the pawnbroker while others took the

96. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
97. Penry I, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
98. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
99. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring that police advise arrestees
of their right to silence and counsel and providing the most broadly recognized protection of the
Fifth Amendment).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”).
101. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
102. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (“In Lockett . . . the plurality . . .
stated the rule we apply today . . . .”); see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986)
(“There is no disputing that this . . . [Court] requires that in capital cases ‘the sentence . . . not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death.’”).
103. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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shop’s money. 106 All went according to plan until Parker announced the
“stickup.” 107 Upon hearing the declaration, the pawnbroker tried to grab
the gun from Parker’s hand 108—it discharged and killed the
pawnbroker. 109 Parker ran out of the pawnshop and jumped into the
waiting get-away vehicle, driven by Lockett. 110 They were both
apprehended soon thereafter. 111
Lockett and Parker were charged with aggravated murder, along with
the statutorily specified aggravating specifications.112 The Ohio death
penalty statute required that upon a conviction of aggravated murder the
trial judge impose the death sentence unless, after
[C]onsidering the nature and circumstances of the offense and
[the defendant’s] history, character, and condition, he found by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the victim had induced or
facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that [the defendant]
would have committed the offense but for the fact that she was
under duress, coercion, or strong provocation or (3) the offense
was “primarily the product of [defendant’s] psychosis or mental
deficiency. 113
In a successful effort to avoid the death penalty, Parker took a plea deal
that required him to testify against Lockett. 114 Lockett was subsequently
convicted. 115 During the sentencing phase she presented mitigation
evidence pertaining to her background, criminal history, and
intelligence. 116 She was subsequently sentenced to death. 117
Lockett appealed her sentence, claiming that Ohio’s death penalty
statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution because the statute failed to allow the sentencer the
opportunity to consider the mitigating circumstances. 118 The Court
agreed with Lockett, noting that the death penalty is “profoundly

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 589 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03, 2929.04 (1975)).
Id. at 593–94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 591.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 602.
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different from all other penalties,” and requires that each defendant be
treated uniquely and given a sentence that best aligns with their crime
and individual characteristics. 119
This opinion from the Lockett plurality was later affirmed and
solidified by the Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 120 firmly
establishing that a defendant must be permitted to present, as mitigating
evidence, any relevant information that might influence a jury to return a
sentence less than death. 121 The omission of such evidence has been
deemed Lockett error. 122
B.

Penry I and Penry II Require that the Jury Be Able to Give
Meaningful Effect to the Mitigation Evidence

While the Lockett Court addressed what types of mitigation evidence
the defendant must be permitted to present, Penry I 123 and Penry II 124
addressed another problem: how a jury can give full and meaningful
effect to the defendant’s evidence. 125 Both Penry I and Penry II dealt
with Texas’s use of “special issue” questions as a method for helping the
jury determine the sentence.
In Penry I, Pamela Carpenter was brutally beaten, raped, and stabbed
to death with a pair of scissors in a small Texas town in 1979.126 Just
before her death, while receiving emergency care, Carpenter provided a
description of her assailant. 127 Her narrative led the police to John Paul
Penry, a recent parolee who had been convicted of rape.128 The police
detained Penry and he confessed.129 As a child, Penry was diagnosed
with organic brain damage, and according to expert testimony, his I.Q.
was 54. 130 His mental difficulties gave him a mental age of six and one
119. Id. at 605.
120. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
121. Id. at 4 (“There is no disputing that this . . . [Court] requires that in capital cases the
sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted))).
122. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 120 n.1 (1982).
123. Penry I, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
124. Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
125. Id. at 786; Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307.
126. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 308.
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half years; Penry was twenty-two at the commission of the crime. 131 In
spite of this evidence, the jury found Penry competent to stand trial, and
he was convicted of capital murder largely on the basis of his voluntary
confessions. 132
During the penalty phase of the trial, Penry presented mitigating
evidence regarding his mental deficiencies and childhood abuse. Dr.
Jose Garcia provided expert testimony for Penry. 133 He testified about
Penry’s moderate retardation due to brain damage (caused from birth or
childhood beatings). 134 Dr. Garcia also testified that a brain disorder at
the time of the attack made it impossible for him to understand the
gravity of his actions. 135
Penry’s mother testified that Penry struggled in school and failed to
even finish first grade. 136 Penry’s sister spoke of how their mother had
frequently beaten Penry over the head with a belt and locked him in his
room for long periods of time; she also said that Penry was in and out of
hospitals. 137 The state presented rebuttal evidence, arguing for Penry’s
culpability in spite of such mitigation.138
At the close of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury was presented
with three “special issues,” according to the Texas death penalty
statute. 139 The jury was asked to respond “yes” or “no” to the following
special issues:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response
to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. 140
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 308–10.
Id. at 308–09.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 § 2(b) (1989).
Penry I, 492 U.S. at 310; TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 § 2(b) (1989).
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If the jury unanimously responded “yes” to all three of the special issues,
then the jury was to return a sentence of death; otherwise, the jury was to
sentence Penry to life in prison. 141 The jury answered “yes” to all of the
special issues and Penry was sentenced to death.142 After a series of
appeals, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
question of whether the special issues adequately allowed the jury to
take into consideration Penry’s mitigation evidence.143
Penry argued that the special issues did not allow the jury to give
meaningful effect to his mitigation evidence, claiming that the “evidence
of mental retardation and childhood abuse has relevance to his moral
culpability beyond the scope of the special issues, and that the jury was
unable to express its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that evidence in
determining whether death was the appropriate punishment.” 144 The
Court agreed, stating that the special issues denied the jurors the ability
to express the view that, in light of the mitigating circumstances, Penry
deserved a life sentence rather than the death penalty. 145 In finding the
Texas special issues inadequate, the Court reasoned that “a reasonable
juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing
the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon
his mitigating evidence.” 146 The Court concluded its analysis of Penry
by stating that sentencers must be able to “consider and give effect to
mitigating evidence of mental retardation” when determining whether or
not to impose the death penalty. 147 Behold, the birth of Penry error.
In 1990, roughly one year after the Court remanded Penry I, Penry
again stood before a sentencing jury. 148 The jury received the same
special issues. 149 In light of the Court’s admonishment in Penry I, the
judge gave this supplemental instruction in an effort to remedy the prior
defect and clarify the role of Penry’s mitigation evidence:
You are instructed that when you deliberate on the questions
posed in the special issues, you are to consider mitigating
circumstances, if any, supported by the evidence presented in
141. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 310.
142. Id. at 311.
143. Id. at 313. Penry also argued that capital punishment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. That issue exceeds the scope of this Comment.
144. Id. at 322.
145. Id. at 322–26.
146. Id. at 326.
147. Id. at 340.
148. Penry II, 532 U.S. at 788–89.
149. Id.
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both phases of the trial, whether presented by the state or the
defendant. A mitigating circumstance may include, but is not
limited to, any aspect of the defendant’s character and record or
circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a
death sentence inappropriate in this case. If you find that there
are any mitigating circumstances in this case, you must decide
how much weight they deserve, if any, and therefore, give effect
and consideration to them in assessing the defendant’s personal
culpability at the time you answer the special issue. If you
determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any,
that a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the
issue under consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an
appropriate response to the personal culpability of the defendant,
a negative finding should be given to one of the special issues. 150
After two and a half hours of deliberation, the jury delivered a sentence
of death. 151 In reviewing the special issues in conjunction with the added
supplemental instruction, the Court again held that the instructions failed
to give the jury a “vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’
to [the mitigation] evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.” 152 The
Court noted that the jury could not possibly follow both the special
issues and the supplemental instruction. 153
Taken together, Penry I and Penry II stand for the notion that the
sentencing instructions to a jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase
must allow the jury to give meaningful effect to the mitigation evidence
provided. If the jury cannot meaningfully consider the breadth of
mitigation evidence presented at trial, the defendant is, in effect, stripped
of the right to present mitigation evidence. What good is the presentation
of evidence if it cannot be considered? Such errors are collectively
referred to as Penry error. 154
III. THREE KEY INGREDIENTS OF HARMLESS ERROR
REVIEW IN CAPITAL HABEAS CASES
Before looking at the circuit split that precipitates this Comment, it is
important to understand three key ingredients in this discussion:

150. Id. at 789–90.
151. Id. at 790.
152. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328.
153. Penry II, 532 U.S. at 800.
154. Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 301 (2007) (“We refer to the inadequacy of the special-issue
instructions as Penry error.”).
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Chapman v. California, 155 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 156 and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. 157
A.

Chapman v. California and the Harmless Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt Standard for Constitutional Violations

Chapman v. California 158 has long determined the error analysis for
constitutional errors on direct review: it requires that the state prove that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 159 In Chapman, Ruth
Elizabeth Chapman was convicted in California of first degree murder,
kidnapping, and larceny; she was sentenced to life in prison. 160 The state
constitution specifically permitted the prosecution to comment on the
defendant’s silence during trial—i.e., post-Miranda silence—in violation
of the Fifth Amendment protections of the United States Constitution. 161
Chapman appealed, arguing that the provision violated her Fifth
Amendment rights. 162 While Chapman’s case was on appeal in the state
courts, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Griffin v.
California, 163 wherein the Court held that any comment or reference to
the defendant’s silence violated the protections of the Fifth Amendment,
rendering California’s state constitutional permission in violation of the
federal constitution. 164
The Griffin Court held the provision unconstitutional, making the
issue in Chapman whether harmless error review should apply to such a
violation. The Court held that harmless error review does apply to
constitutional violations, but it placed the burden upon the beneficiary of
the error. 165 The Court also set a difficult burden for proving harmless
error: “Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 166 Due to the substantial rights at stake, the Chapman

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

386 U.S. 18 (1967).
507 U.S. 619 (1993).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
386 U.S. 18.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 613.
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
Id. at 24.
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Court adopted the common law rule that placed the burden upon the
beneficiary of the error to prove that no injury was suffered from the
party potentially prejudiced by the error. 167 Until Brecht, Chapman was
the standard for harmless error review for constitutional errors. 168
B.

Brecht v. Abrahamson Reduces the State’s Burden by Requiring
the Defense to Prove Substantial and Injurious Effect

In Brecht, Todd Brecht was charged with first degree murder in
Wisconsin. 169 At the trial, Brecht admitted to shooting the victim, but
claimed that it was an accident. 170 In an effort to impeach Brecht, the
prosecution used Brecht’s post-Miranda silence by arguing that if the
shooting actually was an accident, Brecht would have told someone
immediately. 171 The prosecution pointed out that he did not call for help,
that he drove off, that he lied to the arresting police officer, and that
Brecht was silent post-arraignment and pre-trial, after he had been
Mirandized. 172 The defense raised objections to such references, but all
were overruled. 173 The jury subsequently sentenced Brecht to life in
prison. 174 On direct appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with
Brecht that the use of his post-Miranda silence violated the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution but upheld his conviction,
reasoning that the error was harmless. 175
After exhausting his state appeals, Brecht filed a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 176 The Seventh Circuit held that
Chapman should not apply to habeas petitions seeking to correct errors
where the prosecution used post-arrest silence as inculpating
evidence. 177 The Seventh Circuit adopted the standard from Kotteakos v.
United States, 178 which requires that the defendant show that the error
167. Id.
168. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (“Since our landmark decision in
Chapman v. California . . . we have applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in
reviewing claims of constitutional error of the trial type.”).
169. Id. at 624.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 624–25.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 625.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 626.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 627.
178. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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caused substantial and injurious effect. 179 Brecht appealed, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s
adoption of the Kotteakos standard, and applied it to all violations of
post-arrest silence on petition from state courts.180 The Court reasoned
that prior to the collateral attack, two state courts reviewed their case and
applied the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, so a lesser
standard should apply on habeas appeal in order to promote judicial
economy. 181
The Court reasoned that the Chapman standard set too great of a
burden upon the state and imposed significant social and financial costs
upon the judiciary. 182 The Court then set aside the Chapman standard for
collateral attacks in habeas corpus review, making it easier to find
harmless error. 183 Instead of requiring the state to show that the error
was “harmful beyond a reasonable doubt,” 184 the Court shifted the
burden to the defendant, requiring the defendant to show that the error
resulted in “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict.” 185
The Brecht Court separated constitutional errors in habeas cases into
two categories: trial error and structural error. 186 Trial errors occur
“during the presentation of the case to the jury,” 187 and are subject to
harmless-error review due to their lack of bearing upon a constitutional
right. While generally protective of constitutional rights, the Court
concedes that “there may be some constitutional errors which in the
setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless.” 188
If a defendant thinks that an error was not harmless, but negatively
impacted the defendant’s case, the defendant must show that the error
had a substantial and injurious effect upon the jury’s arrival at the
verdict. 189
The Court views structural errors more severely: “At the other end of
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 776.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.
Id. at 636–38.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 637–38.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
Id. at 629–30.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
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the spectrum of constitutional errors lie ‘structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmlesserror’ standards.’” 190 The Court is loath to find structural error and has
done so only in a limited number of memorable cases. 191 Should a
reviewing court find that the error was structural, the decision must be
automatically reversed. 192 This is no small consequence, leading the
courts to infrequently deem errors structural. 193
Chapman still controls the harmless error review of constitutional
error in direct review, but Brecht now controls in collateral attacks. 194
The Court has not determined what harmless error standard applies to
mitigation errors in capital habeas cases.
C.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)

Congress tightened the belt on federal habeas corpus review when it
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). 195 In an effort to promote judicial economy and grant broader
deference to state courts, 196 Congress passed AEDPA with this key
provision:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
190. Id. at 629.
191. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993) (holding that a deficient reasonable
doubt instruction deprives the defendant’s right to fair trial under the Sixth Amendment); Vasquez
v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986) (holding that excluding a potential grand juror on the basis of
race violates the Equal Protection Clause); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1984) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment grants litigants the right to a public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 174 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right to represent
himself pro se); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (holding that failing to provide
indigent defendants with counsel violates the Sixth Amendment); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560,
561 (1958) (holding that a coerced confession violates the Fifth Amendment); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (holding that a defendant has the right to an impartial decision maker, and the
failure to provide a neutral decision maker violates due process).
192. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993).
193. See DAVID B. ROTTMAN & SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 230–32 (2006).
194. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 622–23.
195. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
196. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9–10 (1995) (noting the intent to reduce the delay and abuse of
repetitive filings, and the intent to promote comity with the states).
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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding. 197
This provision set a remarkably high bar for habeas petitioners
collaterally attacking 198 their state court judgments, requiring that they
not only show than an error occurred, but that the state court
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.199 AEDPA’s high
standard grants significant deference to state court determinations: “This
is a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.” 200 The petitioner bears the burden of proving that
the state court unreasonably applied clearly established law, even when
the state court fails to give any rationale for its decision. 201 The 1996
amendments were “designed to curb the abuse of the habeas corpus
process, and particularly to address the problem of delay and repetitive
litigation in capital cases.” 202
While a thorough discussion of AEDPA exceeds the scope of this
Comment, 203 excluding any mention of its constricting effect upon
collateral attacks would be remiss. AEDPA’s diminution of habeas
corpus reviews ties the hands of federal courts asked to issue the writ,
and imposes a weighty burden upon habeas petitioners. This adds to the
task of habeas defendants seeking to reverse the state court’s mitigation
error. Undoubtedly, judicial economy and comity between the state and
federal systems are central to an effective judiciary; however, “errors
that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state
adjudication certainly justify the issuance of the federal writ.” 204 To
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2) (2012).
198. A collateral attack is an “attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal;
esp., an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the ground of the
proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is ineffective.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
200. See Cullen v. Pinholster, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (citations omitted).
201. See Harrington v. Richter, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (describing the application
of AEDPA).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23, at 8 (1995).
203. For a more thorough discussion of AEDPA and its impact on habeas corpus petitions, see
generally Jeffery S. Jacobi, Mostly Harmless: An Analysis of Post-AEDPA Federal Habeas Corpus
Review of State Harmless Error Determinations, 105 MICH. L. REV. 805 (2007).
204. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000).
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preserve the fundamental fairness necessary for an effective and
respected judiciary, cases that meet AEDPA’s high standard should not
then be subject to Brecht’s harmless error standard.
IV. THE SPLIT AND THE NEED FOR CLARITY
The Court has yet to determine whether harmless error review can
ever apply to capital cases on collateral attack. It has, however,
determined that the standard promulgated in Brecht v. Abrahamson 205—
the plaintiff must show that the constitutional error had “substantial and
injurious effect upon the jury’s verdict” 206— applies to errors in noncapital cases. The current debate among the circuits is whether or not the
Brecht harmless error standard should apply to capital cases being
collaterally attacked. The United States Courts of Appeals are split over
the issue in a rather one-sided manner. Seven circuits apply the Brecht
standard to collateral attacks of mitigation errors 207—only the Fifth
Circuit holds otherwise. 208 The remaining circuits have yet to weigh
in. 209 The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Nelson v. Quarterman 210 firmly
placed that circuit on the lonely side of a large split.
Recent years have seen several denied certiorari petitions seeking
resolution of the divisive issue of whether mitigation error should be
subject to harmless error review as described in Brecht. 211 These
petitioners lack guidance from the United States Courts of Appeals due
to the rather one-sided split. A brief and chronological summary of the
split is in order.

205. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
206. Id. at 637 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 775 (1946)).
207. See Dixon v. Houk, 737 F.3d 1003, 1011 (6th. Cir. 2013) (holding that mitigation errors are
subject to harmless review); Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011) (same);
Williams v. Norris, 612 F.3d 941, 948 (8th Cir. 2010) (same); Ferguson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr.,
580 F.3d 1183, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009) (same); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same); Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2005) (same); Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193,
1205 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); supra Part II.A.
208. See Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 314 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Finally, we reject the State’s
argument that any Penry error in this case is subject to harmless-error analysis . . . .”).
209. Several searches on Westlaw using keywords “mitigation,” “mitigation error,” “harmless
error,” “substantial and injurious effect,” “Lockett,” and “capital,” failed to reveal results from the
First, Second, and Third circuits. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Thaler v. McGowen, 133
S. Ct. 647 (2012) (No. 12-82), at 14–21.
210. Id.
211. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Thaler v. McGowen, 133 S. Ct. 647 (2012) (No. 12-82);
Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Campbell v. Texas, 134 S. Ct. 53 (2013) (No. 12-8631).
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Survey of the Split

The Tenth Circuit, in Bryson v. Ward, 212 led the charge in the issue of
whether harmless error review applies in capital habeas cases. In Bryson,
the defendant assisted in murdering the husband of a woman with whom
he was romantically involved. 213 Bryson confessed and was convicted of
capital murder. 214 During the sentencing phase of the trial, Bryson
sought to present a videotape of his confession as mitigation evidence,
but the trial court excluded the tape. 215 While the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the exclusion of the videotape violated Lockett, it concluded that the
“application of a harmless error analysis . . . [is] not ‘an unreasonable
application of clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent,” 216 thereby
failing to meet AEDPA’s standard. It further concluded that Brecht
applied to mitigation errors, and that the exclusion of the tape did not
have a substantial and injurious effect upon the jury’s verdict. 217
The Fourth Circuit, in Jones v. Polk, 218 explicitly rejected the
Chapman standard and applied the Brecht harmless error standard. In
Jones, the defendant had been convicted of first degree murder for
killing his adult son. 219 During the sentencing phase, the North Carolina
trial court refused to allow one of Jones’s relatives to testify that “Jones
had expressed remorse about the murder.” 220 While a violation of
Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the error
was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” the harmless error standard
applied in Chapman. 221 In affirming the North Carolina high court, the
Fourth Circuit said that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
unreasonably applied the Chapman standard. 222 The court corrected the
error, applying the Brecht standard and concluding that the mitigation
error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect” upon Jones.223

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

187 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1197–99.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1204–05.
Id. at 1205 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)).
Id.
401 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit initially required remand for mitigation errors, 224
but has since changed its ways. In Sims v. Brown, 225 Mitchell Sims was
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the gruesome
killing of a Domino’s Pizza delivery person. 226 Sims presented extensive
mitigation evidence that revealed childhood physical and sexual abuse,
chronic depression, forced incest, and rape.227 In its closing statements
during the sentencing phase, the prosecution incorrectly stated the law of
mitigation, mischaracterizing how the jury should view the mitigation
evidence. 228 The Ninth Circuit recognized the error, but rejected the
application of Chapman, asserting that Brecht controlled and that the
statements had a substantial and injurious effect upon the jury. 229
The Fifth Circuit, in Nelson v. Quarterman, 230 squarely rejected
harmless error review in habeas review of a capital case.231 Nelson will
be discussed in detail in Part IV.C.
The Eleventh Circuit registered its opinion in Ferguson v. Secretary
for Department of Corrections. 232 In Ferguson, the defendant was
convicted of eight first degree murders that took place in Florida. 233
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge told the jury that he
would later instruct them as to the mitigation factors that they “may
consider,” as codified in the statutory scheme. 234 Ferguson claimed that
the court erred by not allowing non-statutory mitigation evidence, 235 a
violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 236 which required that juries be
permitted to consider such evidence.237 The Eleventh Circuit applied the
Brecht harmless error standard, finding that the denial of the mitigation
factors did not have a substantial and injurious effect upon the jury’s
verdict. 238

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1998).
425 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 566–67.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 570–71, 600–01.
472 F.3d 287, 314 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id.
580 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
481 U.S. 393 (1987).
See id. at 398–99.
See Ferguson, 580 F.3d at 1203.
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The Eighth Circuit, in Williams v. Norris, 239 jumped into the melee. In
Williams, the defendant escaped prison in Arkansas, shot and killed a
man, and then stole the deceased’s guns and truck. 240 He eluded police
for a day and was then captured. 241 He was convicted of capital murder,
and during the sentencing phase of his trial, Williams sought to present
testimony regarding the prison’s negligence as a mitigating factor. 242
While the Eighth Circuit did say that “[e]ven if there was an error in
denying this claim, it was harmless,” 243 it did not base its holding on
either Brecht or Chapman. It merely asserted that harmless error review
applies.
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the question of harmless error review
in capital habeas cases in Jones v. Basinger. 244 In Jones, the defendant
was convicted in Indiana for multiple murders that occurred during a
robbery. 245 The prosecution had presented “detailed and damning
double-hearsay,” which was admitted despite the defense counsel’s
repeated objections. 246 The district court denied Jones’s habeas corpus
petition; 247 the Seventh Circuit disagreed and applied the Brecht
standard to show that the hearsay had substantial and injurious effect
upon the defendant. 248
The Sixth Circuit similarly applies the Brecht standard and will be
discussed at length in Part IV.B.
In order to better understand the role of harmless error review in
capital cases and to help us arrive at the appropriate application of
harmless error review, this Comment looks at the Sixth Circuit and Fifth
Circuit as examples of either side of the split. The Sixth Circuit
represents the side of the split that applies Brecht harmless error review
to mitigation error, while the Fifth Circuit shows a circuit that refuses to
apply harmless error review.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

612 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 945.
Id.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 948 (citing McGehee v. Norris, 588 F.3d 1185, 1197 (8th Cir. 2009)).
635 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1052–56.
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The Sixth Circuit Adopts the Brecht Harmless Error Standard

The Sixth Circuit, in Dixon v. Houk, 249 recently re-affirmed its
allegiance to the populous side of the split over whether Brecht applies
in capital habeas cases. 250 Dixon provides both a good and troubling
example of why the Brecht standard provides faulty results. The
example is good because it shows how the Brecht standard will allow a
death sentence to stand in spite of the trial court omitting highly relevant
mitigation evidence. Dixon is a troubling example because the egregious
nature of the murder may cloud the courts’ vision regarding the
deleterious effects of omitting mitigation evidence. Bad facts make bad
law, and Dixon underscores this adage.
The facts of this case are particularly gut wrenching. Archie Dixon
was convicted of first degree murder for tying the victim to a bed,
beating him, stealing his wallet and car, and driving him out of town
where Dixon then buried him alive. 251 As is true with many capital
cases, the facts surrounding the murder are quite unpleasant.
However, particularly gruesome facts do not bear upon what
mitigation evidence the defendant may offer to the jury. In Dixon’s case,
he had a compelling story to tell. While only nineteen years old with no
adult criminal record, Dixon spent 234 nights in jail after he was
wrongfully charged with rape and aggravated burglary. 252 Three months
into his unlawful prison term, Dixon’s psychological examination
revealed anxiety, depression, personal family problems, and the doctor
expressed doubts about Dixon’s emotional stability. 253 Eight months into
his term, Dixon was exonerated after DNA and fingerprint evidence
removed any doubt of his innocence. 254
Only four months after his release, Dixon committed the murder for
which he was convicted, 255 and the jury sentenced him to death. 256
During the mitigation phase of the trial, Dixon sought to inform the jury
of this wrongful conviction—including the associated depression,

249. 737 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2013).
250. See id. at 1011; Campbell v. Bradshaw, 674 F.3d 578, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2012) (adopting
harmless error review without providing rationale for its decision).
251. Dixon, 737 F.3d at 1006.
252. Id. at 1014 (Merrit, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (citing to report of defense mitigation specialist).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1006 (majority opinion).
256. Id.
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anxiety, and emotional instability—as mitigation evidence. 257 The court
denied him the chance to present the evidence, 258 directly contravening
the Lockett mandate that capital defendants be able to present to the jury
any mitigation evidence “that might serve as a basis for a sentence less
than death.” 259 The Ohio Supreme Court found that the trial court did
commit Lockett error, but determined that the error was harmless and
would not have affected the sentence. 260 That court briefly stated that
“[t]he trial court should have permitted this evidence to be submitted for
the jury’s consideration as a mitigating factor . . . because it fits within
the history, character, and background of the offender. Nevertheless, our
independent reassessment of the sentence will minimize any prejudicial
impact.” 261
Dixon filed a habeas corpus petition, and ultimately the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Ohio Supreme Court’s harmless error determination, citing
Brecht as the bar that the petitioner must overcome. 262 The Sixth Circuit
provided nothing more than a cursory two sentences backing up this
determination:
Given the specific facts of Dixon’s crime and the compelling
aggravating evidence in this case, evidence of Dixon’s prior
wrongful incarceration due to unrelated rape allegations would,
at best, have been negligibly mitigating. We do not believe that
its exclusion had any substantial effect on Dixon’s sentencing.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s conclusion that the exclusion of
Dixon’s wrongful incarceration was harmless is therefore not
contrary to clearly established federal law.263
At the time of publication, Dixon sits on death row in Ohio. 264
When the jury sentenced Dixon to death, they were completely
unaware of his harrowing experience in jail and the associated
psychological problems. Would the jury have sentenced Dixon to death
had they known about this wrongful imprisonment and correlated
psychological problems? This unanswerable question lies at the heart of

257. Id. at 1008.
258. Id.
259. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
260. Dixon, 737 F.3d at 1011.
261. State v. Dixon, 805 N.E.2d 1042, 1057 (Ohio 2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262. Id.
263. Dixon, 737 F.3d at 1011 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993)).
264. Death Row Inmates, OHIO DEP’T OF REHABILITATION & CORRECTION (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/public/deathrow.htm.
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the issue with Brecht harmless error review. When the stakes could not
be higher—when a life hangs in the balance—the courts that apply
Brecht become willing to exchange their value judgment for that of the
entire jury. Because only one juror would need to find that the wrongful
imprisonment was enough to give Dixon a sentence less than death, 265
denying all twelve jurors the chance to hear admittedly relevant
mitigation evidence is to “substitute [the court’s] moral judgment for the
jury’s.” 266
C.

The Fifth Circuit Rejects Harmless Error Review: Nelson v.
Quarterman

In Nelson v. Quarterman, 267 the Fifth Circuit tackled the issue of
harmless error head-on in a case even more gut-wrenching than Dixon.
In Nelson, defendant Billy Ray Nelson was convicted in a capital trial
for the brutal sexual assault and murder of his neighbor, Charla
Wheat. 268 Nelson had tricked Wheat and her roommate, Carol Maynard,
into letting him into their apartment to use the phone. 269 Once inside, he
cut the telephone wire, stabbed Wheat, and ushered both women into the
bedroom. 270 He then forced them to perform sexual acts with him; he
subsequently stabbed them both. 271 Maynard acted dead on the floor
while Wheat resisted and screamed; Nelson stabbed Wheat until she
died. 272 Maynard survived. 273
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Nelson presented voluminous
mitigation evidence: childhood neglect, abandonment by his mother
when he was fourteen, significant substance abuse, troubled
relationships with women and family, psychiatric evidence of borderline
personality disorder, and separation from his child. 274 The jury
instructions were in the form of special issue questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of
265. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (“In criminal cases this requirement
of unanimity extends to all issues—character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment—which
are left to the jury.”).
266. Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 315 (5th Cir. 2006).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 290.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 304–05.
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the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result (“the deliberateness special issue”); and
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society (“the future-dangerousness special
issue”). 275
The Fifth Circuit determined that these special issue questions failed
to adequately allow the jurors to give meaningful effect to the mitigation
evidence that Nelson presented. 276 It reasoned that “although the jury
may have been able to give partial effect to this evidence through the
deliberateness special issue, there is a reasonable likelihood that it was
unable to give full effect to this evidence.”277
The court then addressed the issue of whether harmless error review
could ever be applied to mitigation error. The court noted that “the
Supreme Court has never applied a harmless-error analysis to a Penry
claim or given any indication that harmless error might apply in its long
line of post-Furman cases addressing the jury’s ability to give full effect
to a capital defendant’s mitigating evidence.” 278 The court argued that
the Supreme Court has never applied harmless-error analysis to
mitigation error because “Penry error deprives the jury of a vehicle for
expressing its reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background,
character, and crime.” 279 The court differentiated the determinations of
fact permitted by the special issue questions from the moral issues
central to the jury giving meaningful effect to the presented mitigation
evidence.280 While the court did not expressly hold that Penry error
requires automatic reversal, 281 it reasoned that because such errors
prevent the jury from expressing its reasoned moral response by giving
meaningful effect to the mitigation evidence, such errors cannot be
subject to harmless error review; such analysis allows the court to
“substitute its own moral judgment for the jury’s.” 282
275. Id. at 290 (quoting TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071(b) (1991)).
276. Id. at 307–14.
277. Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
278. Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
279. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).
280. Id.
281. While the majority left such a conclusion to inference, the concurrence left nothing to the
imagination: “Under principles of law clearly established by the Supreme Court’s decisions, the
constitutional violation in this case was a ‘structural defect’ that cannot be analyzed as harmless
‘trial error.’” Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 332 (5th Cir. 2006) (Dennis, J., concurring).
282. Id. at 315.
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The Fifth Circuit’s rationale for rejecting Brecht ultimately rests in
the notion that the determination to take a person’s life—the burden
placed upon capital juries—is a moral determination that should lie
solely in the hands of the jury, not those of the judge. 283 When an error is
committed and the reviewing court must determine the effect the
mitigating evidence would have had on the jury, the appellate judge then
takes on the role of the juror. This is to substitute the moral judgment of
jury with that of the judge—an untenable result. This logic drives the
argument that a low harmless error standard should not apply to habeas
review of capital cases.
V.

HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW SHOULD REQUIRE THE
STATE TO PROVE THAT THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

This Comment argues that harmless error review should only apply to
capital mitigation errors during habeas corpus review when the state
proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
has yet to determine whether harmless error review ever applies to such
mitigation errors 284 and the Court has never extended its holding in
Brecht to capital cases. Brecht’s harmless error standard places the
burden of proof upon the defendant to show that the error had a
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.” 285 This requires nothing of the state and places a significant
burden upon the defendant. Considering the high stakes of capital
punishment cases and that the Court has not considered the Brecht
standard’s application to capital cases, 286 the Court should instead apply
the Chapman standard—requiring the state to prove that the error was

283. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358–60 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (four
justices arguing that a jury should make a decision to sentence a defendant to death); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (requiring a jury to find the aggravating factors necessary to
qualify a defendant for the death penalty); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I therefore conclude
that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a
defendant to death.”).
284. Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 316 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never decided “whether harmless error review is ever appropriate” with mitigation error
during collateral review).
285. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
286. The text of the Brecht opinion never mentions capital punishment, and Justice Souter
admitted that the Supreme Court has never determined whether harmless error review applies to
mitigation error. See Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297, 316 (2007).
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“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 287—to mitigation errors in capital
habeas corpus cases. This standard places the burden on the state,
requiring the state to show the harmlessness of the mitigation error.
At the foundation of harmless error review lays the understanding that
although the trial court committed an error, the impact of the error may
be de minimus and does not alter the outcome of the case.288 This
approach to errors appeals to logic and judicial economy. As one
commentator pointed out, nearly every defendant could find at least
some error in his or her trial:
Almost every criminal defendant who is found guilty can find
some mistake in the proceedings leading to his conviction.
Because reversal for all such errors would be too costly and
would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice
system, courts and legislatures have developed ‘harmless error’
rules that uphold a decision tainted by error if the error is found
not to have affected the outcome at trial. The rules, contained in
both common law and statutes, reach even those errors that
affect the constitutional rights of the defendant. 289
Were the courts to apply a stricter error analysis to all petitions—such
as automatic remand for all errors—our system would incur massive
costs and enormous delays, rendering an already slow system nearly
ineffective. 290 Harmless error review, while incredibly complex and
often inconsistently applied, 291 finds proper application in many aspects
of this nation’s jurisprudence. If an error was committed that simply did
not harm the outcome of the case, what value is a re-trial? In the
presence of innocuous mistakes, harmless error review serves its purpose
well.
While harmless error review has a role in non-capital cases, its use in
capital cases requires care and caution in order to avoid specious results.

287. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (“Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding
evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for setting
aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every
stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s
substantial rights.”).
289. James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 740, 740 (1987).
290. Some commentators suggest that mitigation errors require automatic remand. See, e.g.,
Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 314 (1991).
291. See generally ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
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Not only is death different, 292 so is the effect of error in capital cases.
The Lockett Court understood this when it said:
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so
profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid
the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in
capital cases. The need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the
individual is far more important than in noncapital cases. A
variety of flexible techniques—probation, parole, work
furloughs, to name a few—and various post-conviction remedies
may be available to modify an initial sentence of confinement in
noncapital cases. The nonavailability of corrective or modifying
mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence
underscores the need for individualized consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence. 293
The Court recognized the irrevocable nature of the death penalty and the
need to consider this difference when shaping the contours of capital
jurisprudence. Thus, when error occurs in a capital case, the proper
remedy should be cautiously considered.
Mitigation error—whether the jury is prevented from hearing
evidence the defense wishes to present or the jury instructions prevent
the jury from giving full and meaningful effect to the presented
evidence 294—invites harm that far exceeds that of any other criminal
case: the possibility of a wrongful death. In determining that a mitigation
error was harmless, the judge replaces his or her judgment for that of the
jury, 295 essentially asserting that had the jury heard the mitigation
evidence, it could not have swayed even one of the jurors. This flies in
the face of the individualization requirement of mitigation
consideration. 296 Mitigation errors in capital cases do not merely
increase the chance of a negative outcome for the defendant, 297 but they
reduce a chance at life. 298
292. See supra Part I.
293. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 315 (5th Cir. 2006).
296. See supra Part I.B.3.
297. In a noncapital case, error creates the possibility for the miscarriage of justice in the form of
a wrongful conviction or an improper sentence. In the mitigation phase of a capital case the stakes—
literally life or death—could not be higher.
298. For a discussion on the loss of chance doctrine, a tort theory applied to medical malpractice
cases, see generally Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983);
Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 FIU L. Rev. 591
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These high stakes require an error standard that matches the gravity of
harm. While seven circuits think that Brecht harmless error review
should apply to capital cases, 299 this Comment argues that such an
application is misguided. Chapman v. California 300 provides the better
harmless error standard for capital cases—that the state must prove that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.

Brecht Should Not Apply to Mitigation Errors Because it Fails to
Consider the Heightened Consequences of Capital Cases

In Brecht, discussed above in Part IV.A, the defendant confessed guilt
but claimed that the shooting was accidental.301 During the trial, the
prosecution referred to Brecht’s pre-Miranda failure to tell anyone that
the shooting was accidental, and also pointed to his post-Miranda
silence on the issue. 302 Brecht was convicted, but appealed on the basis
that referring to his post-Miranda silence violated due process. 303
Applying the Chapman standard—constitutional errors require reversal
unless they are “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 304—the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the use of his
silence was a constitutional violation that had no impact on the jury’s
verdict. 305 Brecht filed a writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, reasoning that the Chapman standard set too
high of a burden upon the state and imposed significant social and
financial costs to the judicial system. 306 The Court then set aside the
Chapman standard for collateral attacks in habeas corpus petitions and
shifted the burden to the defendant, requiring them to show that the error
resulted in “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict.” 307
It is vitally important to remember the facts of this case when
considering whether the Brecht harmless error standard should extend to
(2013); and Matthew Wurdeman, Loss-of-Chance Doctrine in Washington: From Herskovits to
Mohr and the Need for Clarification, 89 WASH. L. REV. 603 (2014).
299. See supra Part IV.A.
300. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
301. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 624 (1993).
302. Id. at 624–25.
303. Id. at 626.
304. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
305. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court’s conviction. Brecht, 507 U.S.
at 626.
306. Id. at 637.
307. Id. at 637–38.
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capital cases. In Brecht, the issue was a so-called Doyle error: using a
person’s lawful right to silence 308 against that person at trial.309 Brecht
was not a capital punishment case and accordingly did not deal with
errors that could result in the ultimate deprivation of one’s liberty: death.
The stakes of the error analysis lacked the gravity of a capital case
because death was not a possible punishment.
Rather than apply the Chapman standard of review, the Brecht Court
concluded that a less rigid standard should apply. 310 This resulted in the
adoption of the Kotteakos 311 standard, 312 which required the appellant to
show that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.” 313 Not only does this place an incredible
burden upon the petitioner, but the plain language of Brecht shows that
Court intended that the standard be applied to the jury’s verdict, not
capital sentences. 314 In framing the issue, the Court noted that the issue
in Brecht was whether the use of Brecht’s post-Miranda silence “had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.” 315 The Court did not expressly consider that the standard would
be applied in a markedly different context—capital sentencing—with a
drastically heightened potential consequence.
B.

The Brecht Standard Fails to Protect the Jury’s Ability to Hear and
Give Meaningful Effect to Mitigation Evidence

Applying the less stringent harmless error review adopted in Brecht to
capital cases undermines Lockett 316 and Penry, 317 the foundational
mitigation cases. The Lockett Court granted expansive deference to the
defendant as to the scope of mitigating evidence the defendant could
introduce, requiring that in “all but the rarest kind of capital case, [the
sentencer must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of the defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623–24.
Id. at 637.
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638.
Id. at 638 (quotation marks omitted).
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Penry I, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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sentence less than death.” 318 The Court also expressed extreme risk
aversion to the death penalty when a jury might impose a lesser
sentence. 319 Penry required that the sentencer be “provided with a
vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ to that [mitigating]
evidence.” 320
While the Court’s rationale in Brecht appeals to logic, judicial
economy, and respect for the state court’s determination under the facts
of that case, applying the same analysis to capital cases may result in
outcomes contrary to the principles established in Lockett and Penry
regarding the necessity of preserving the jury’s ability to hear and give
meaningful effect to mitigation evidence. Applying the same error
standard to capital cases ignores the fundamentally unique nature of a
capital case and requires a thoughtful and intentional decision as to
which error standard should apply. As Justice Souter noted in his
concurrence in Smith v. Texas, 321 the Supreme Court has never
determined whether Brecht’s harmless error standard should ever apply
to mitigation error in habeas review. 322
C.

The Chapman “Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Standard
Satisfies the Need for Judicial Economy While Respecting the
Gravity of Capital Punishment

The Court should determine that collateral attacks are subject to a less
stringent harmless error review. While the notion that “collateral review
is different from direct review resounds throughout our habeas
jurisprudence,” 323 and AEDPA raised the bar for collateral attacks even
higher, 324 the Court should find a pleasant corollary in noting that capital
collateral review of a constitutional deprivation differs greatly from
noncapital cases where the defendant’s life does not hang in the balance.
The stakes are significantly higher and the negative implications of error
cannot be overstated. Because of the severe implications of finding
318. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
319. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328 (“Our reasoning in Lockett . . . thus compels a remand for
resentencing so that we do not ‘risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty.’” (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 119 (1982)
(O’Connor, J., concurring))).
320. Id. at 328 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
321. 550 U.S. 297, 316 (2007).
322. Id.
323. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993).
324. See supra Part III.C.
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structural error—a court must vacate the sentence and conduct a new
punishment phase of the trial—circuits are understandably hesitant to
call an error structural. Requiring an entirely new sentencing trial for a
clearly insignificant and harmless error flies in the face of judicial
economy and defies logic. Yet, rather than responding to this severe
outcome by quickly calling errors harmless, the circuits need a harmless
error analysis that handles the particularities of capital cases.
The Court in Brecht rightly noted that collateral attacks in habeas
cases ask much of the federal courts. 325 In habeas cases the petitioner has
necessarily exhausted all state remedies,326 and the petitioner should not
be permitted to re-litigate the case when justice was properly applied by
the state. However, the liberty interest at stake in capital cases must be
distinguished from other constitutional errors with lesser consequences.
If Brecht harmless error review should not apply to habeas review of
capital cases, what standard should apply? While it is tempting to argue
that mitigation error requires automatic remand, 327 it would be
remarkably inefficient and illogical to require remand in a case where
reasonable minds would agree that no prejudice occurred. Imagine a
case, for example, where the defendant introduced significant evidence
pertaining to his difficult upbringing and abuse. In an effort to drive
home his point, the defendant wanted to share a lengthy story about how
his father took his teddy bear and threw it against the wall when in a
rage. The judge did not allow this story, because the defendant had
already discussed his father’s anger and abuse at length, telling several
stories. Should this case be remanded because the judge did not allow
this mitigation evidence, which clearly fits within the ambit of Lockett’s
vast range of admissible mitigation evidence? This Comment argues not.
Even though such evidence may meet the low threshold of relevance, its
probative value would be miniscule. Therefore, an appropriate standard
is necessary, one that considers the high consequences of capital
sentencing, but also takes a rational approach to promoting judicial
economy.
Applying the Chapman standard to collateral attacks of habeas cases
takes into account that death is different while balancing issues of
comity and judicial economy. The standard would require that the state
325. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38.
326. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that—the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . .”).
327. See generally Marla L. Mitchell, The Wizardry of Harmless Error: Brain, Heart, Courage
Required When Reviewing Capital Sentences, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (1994).
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prove the harmlessness of the error, rather than adding to the burden of
the defendant. The standard would take into account the unique nature of
death while also considering that collateral attack is different. The
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard would also recognize the
legislative intent 328 behind AEDPA’s habeas constriction by continuing
to permit harmless error review in capital punishment cases and granting
deference to the state courts.
When the Supreme Court requires that “the sentencer . . . [must] not
be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death,” 329 the Court should similarly require that the state prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that excluding such mitigation evidence was
harmless. With the stakes as high as death and in light of the
understanding that capital cases are different, 330 making the defendant
show that the mitigation error had a substantial and injurious effect on
the jury’s determination of the sentence perversely denies the jury a
chance to provide a reasoned moral response and it reduces the
defendant’s chance at receiving a sentence less than death. Requiring the
defendant to prove substantial and injurious effect shifts the burden in a
way that cuts against fundamental understanding of who carries the
burden of proof in criminal cases. 331 Placing the burden upon the
potentially harmed party is contrary to the “original common-law
harmless-error rule [that] put the burden on the beneficiary of the error
either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his
erroneously obtained judgment.” 332
When looking at the emphatic language of Lockett and Penry,
applying the Brecht harmless error standard to mitigation errors
drastically undercuts the force and effect of these essential cases.333 The
328. H.R. REP. NO. 104-23 (1995) (seeking increase judicial economy and comity with the
states).
329. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
330. See supra Part I.
331. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
332. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (citing generally 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 21 (3d ed. 1940)).
333. See Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989) (“Our decisions . . . have reaffirmed that the Eighth
Amendment mandates an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty.”);
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of
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Court should apply the Chapman harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard to capital habeas review of mitigation errors. Another reason
for applying the Chapman standard exists: the impact upon capital
jurors.
VI. THE HARM TO CAPITAL JURIES FURTHER SHOWS THAT
CAPITAL SENTENCING REQUIRES A HIGH HARMLESS
ERROR STANDARD
Most thought and analysis regarding capital punishment revolves
around the victims and defendants, and understandably so. Theirs are the
lives ended and changed; their stories are the ones told on television and
written about in the papers. However, focusing on these victims and
defendants overlooks another key player in capital cases, one who is
rarely seen or discussed: the capital jury. Studies analyzing the impact of
capital jury participation reveal rather shocking results. 334
Society asks much of capital jurors. They are subjected to weeks or
months of odious and graphic stories, and sometimes sequestered from
normal life. 335 They are asked to not only hear the horrifying details of a
case, but also to participate in the story by determining the future of the
defendant. Capital jurors must sit through weeks of trial and testimony,
hearing the stories of the victim and engaging with the story of the
defendant, and ultimately, these average people are given the power to
snuff out that person’s life or send them to prison forever. As research
and scholarship increasingly study the effects of participating on a
capital jury, some have referred to jurors as the “unrecognized victims of
the death penalty.” 336
Listening to testimony and viewing evidence that often contains
gruesome images and explicit videos can result in significant
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” (emphasis in
original)).
334. See generally Theodore B. Feldman & Roger A. Bell, Juror Stress: Identification and
Intervention, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 409 (1993); Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn
Winget, The Occupational Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 325
(1992).
335. See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467–68 (1965) (“The members of the jury were
sequestered in accordance with Louisiana law during the course of the trial, and were ‘placed in
charge of the Sheriff’ by the trial judge.”).
336. Janvier Slick, The Weight of ‘Playing God’: In Capital Punishment Cases, Jurors are
Punished, THE OREGONIAN, October 14, 2011, at B5; see also Paula Mitchell, The Weight of
Capital Punishment on Jurors, Justices, Governors and Executioners, VERDICT,
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/10/25/weight-capital-punishment-jurors-justices-governorsexecutioners (last visited May 9, 2014).
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psychological harm. In a New York Times article, William Glaberson
profiled the jurors involved in the horrific Petit family murder in
Cheshire, Connecticut. 337 The twelve jurors spent two months listening
to the harrowing details of the murderer’s intrusion into the victims’
home, the rape and strangulation of the mother and the subsequent
burning of the children. 338 The jurors saw pictures. They lived in that
horrific night for two months, and spent the subsequent months
attempting to revive normalcy in their lives. One juror said “I am
beginning to feel I am going to go to my grave with this.” 339 Another
juror recounts flashbacks to the trial occurring during dinner parties; yet
another related compulsively checking window and door locks, also
telling of disturbing nightmares. 340 The jurors spoke sympathetically
about those who would serve on subsequent capital juries because of the
traumatic experiences those jurors would face. 341
Academic research of juries shows the significant impact upon capital
jurors’ psyches. 342 One study found psychological trauma in two-thirds
of jurors. 343 Another study found that jurors who impose the death
penalty experience higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
than do those who impose a life imprisonment sentence. 344 The second
study found generalized experiences of loneliness, regret, nightmares
and other sleep issues, and increased use of drugs and alcohol. 345
The judiciary must recognize the heightened burden placed upon
jurors in capital trials. The constitutional guarantee of jury trials in
criminal cases 346 requires jurors to listen to and engage with troubling
information and images. A significant part of recognizing this burden is
to respect the juror. It becomes vitally important, then, that the judiciary
not only ensure that the defendant has the ability to present relevant
mitigation evidence to the jury, but that the jury is given the chance to
make a fully informed decision about whether or not to sentence the

337. William Glaberson, Harrowing Cheshire Case Still Haunts Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2011, at MB1.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Kaplan & Winget, supra note 334.
343. Id.
344. Michael E. Antonio, Stress and the Capital Jury: How Male and Female Jurors React to
Serving on a Murder Trial, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 396, 397 (2008).
345. Id.
346. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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defendant to death. This not only comports with Penry, 347 it minimizes
the potential traumatic effect of jury service.
With juror impact well documented, it seems remarkably unjust to ask
the jury to sentence the defendant to death without the relevant
mitigating evidence that the defendant seeks to introduce. Considering
the significant impact upon jurors in capital cases, a juror could suffer
from even greater emotional and psychological trauma should a juror
later find out that they sentenced a person to death without knowing all
of the relevant and constitutionally required mitigation evidence.
Imagine, for a moment, the potential psychological damage upon a juror
who sentenced a person to death and later discovered that material
mitigation evidence had been hidden that would have altered their
decision.
Of course, not all mitigation errors are inherently structural and
require remand. Remand not only would subject a whole new set of
jurors to the same traumatizing experience, it would further increase the
costs of a wildly expensive process. 348 Such automatic remand cuts
against efforts at judicial economy. However, the Brecht standard, which
requires that the defendant prove that the mitigation error had
“substantial and injurious effect,” 349 sets too low a bar. The Court should
require the state to prove that the mitigation error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt—the Chapman standard 350—which would consider the
severe nature of capital cases while only further burdening the judiciary
in meritorious cases. Such an approach balances the need for judicial
economy and respect for the gravity of capital punishment. Applying the
Chapman standard would incentivize trial courts to ensure that all
potentially relevant mitigation evidence was admitted; this would ensure
that jurors were able to make a decision that not only resulted in justice
for the defendant, but that comported with that juror’s conscience and
minimized negative psychological impact.
To call mitigation error harmless is to claim to understand how the
omitted evidence would have impacted the jury’s deliberations after the
sentencing phase. It is to replace the jury’s response with that of the

347. Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 314 (5th Cir. 2005).
348. See Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of
Economic Crisis, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 14–18 (October 2009), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf.
349. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993).
350. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
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judge, a trade prohibited by the mitigation jurisprudence of this nation
that requires individualization and the reasoned moral response of each
juror.
CONCLUSION
The use of harmless error review when considering mitigation errors
during collateral attack is a divisive issue that the Court has yet to
address, in spite of numerous certiorari petitions and pleas from the
states. Six circuits hold that mitigation errors should be considered trial
errors and subject to the Brecht harmless error standard during habeas
review, one holds that harmless error review should apply (without
saying what standard); only one argues that harmless error review has no
place in the mitigation context. The Court should clarify this muddy
issue by determining that Chapman v. California offers the appropriate
standard: that the state must prove that the mitigation error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court is “satisfied that this
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a
greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.”351 In
response to this difference and the impact upon jurors, the Court should
adopt the higher Chapman “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard when reviewing mitigation errors in capital habeas cases.

351. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).

